speaker: Istvan Aranyosi (Bilkent University)
title: Explanatory role Functionalism
abstract: I to put forward a new version of analytic functionalism, based on an apparently minor change regarding what the commonsense component of the view is supposed to ascribe. In particular, I will call this new version “explanatory role functionalism” instead of “causal role functionalism”, thus indicating that it is the explanatory role mental state types play between stimulus and behaviour that serves as the meaning of mental terms. I will first formulate the details of the view, after which I will argue that it can be turned into an argument for physicalism in the guise of the type identity theory, à la Lewis 1966. I then show how explanatory role functionalism resists all the objection that have been put against causal role functionalism per se or against its physicalistic type identity component.
more info: http://neurophilosophy.unimi.it/index.php/next-lunch-time/icalrepeat.detail/2014/05/27/162/32/istvan-aranyosi